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Thank you to Case Western Reserve University School of Law, and
in particular Dean Michael Scharf, for providing me with the privilege
of delivering the Klatsky Endowed Lecture on Human Rights. Thank
you, Milena Sterio, for your wonderful introduction.
It is my honor to receive the Cox International Law Center’s
Humanitarian Award for Advancing Global Justice and join the
inspiring array of international law scholars and practitioners who have
received it in years prior.
I am also pleased to have the opportunity to speak today to such
an engaged audience of students, professors, lawyers, and members of
the Case Western community about the interplay of human rights and
accountability in peace processes.

1.

Dr. Paul R. Williams is the Rebecca I. Grazier Professor of Law and
International Relations at American University. Professor Williams
teaches at the School of International Service and the Washington College
of Law and also directs the joint JD/MA program in International
Relations. He holds a Ph.D. from Cambridge University, J.D. from
Stanford Law School, and B.A. from UC Davis. Professor Williams is cofounder of the Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG), a nonprofit group, which provides pro bono legal assistance to states and
governments involved in peace negotiations, post-conflict constitution
drafting, and war crimes prosecutions. Over the course of his legal
practice, Professor Williams has assisted with over two dozen peace
negotiations and post conflict constitutions. Professor Williams has
advised governments across Europe, Asia, as well as North and SubSaharan Africa on establishing mechanisms of transitional justice, state
recognition, self-determination and state succession issues, and on drafting
and implementing post-conflict constitutions. The author is grateful for
the research and editing assistance provided by Isabela Karibjanian and
Jessica Levy.

491

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020)
Lawyering Peace

There are currently over thirty active armed conflicts across the
globe. 2 While a small percentage of these conflicts will end in outright
victory for one of the parties, the vast majority of those that end will
be resolved through peace negotiations. 3 At this moment, there are
about two dozen active peace negotiations around the world ranging
from Sudan to Afghanistan to Yemen. 4 In each of these negotiations,
the parties face the conundrum of what level of justice is appropriate
to ensure a durable peace.
During peace negotiations, the parties to a conflict and the
mediators often prioritize securing peace and, to do so, try to get to an
agreement as quickly as possible. Historically, this left the notion of
justice to be considered at a later time and encouraged impunity for
leaders who may have been responsible for atrocities during the conflict.
For instance, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, who negotiated the
Dayton Accords that ended the war in Bosnia in 1995, famously
described then-Serbian President Slobodan Milošević as both an
arsonist and a fireman. 5 As an arsonist, Milošević instigated and fanned
the flames of crimes against humanity and genocide in the Balkans. 6
Yet, Holbrooke believed he also needed Milošević in the role of a
fireman to sign a peace deal in 1995 to put out the very fires Milošević
started. 7 The pursuit of justice was shelved in favor of a signed

2.

See Mark Prigg, The world at war: Stunning interactive map reveals
EVERY conflict currently active around the world, DAILY MAIL (Apr. 28,
2017),
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-4453666/Theworld-war-Interactive-map-reveals-conflicts.html
[https://perma.cc/V3LU-KFJ8].

3.

See Virginia Page Fortna, Where Have All the Victories Gone?
Peacekeeping and War Outcomes 48 (Working Paper Prepared for
Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association,
Aug.
2009),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/9e92/99e686c49befe03bf7b863b9c8b252
55c8e6.pdf [https://perma.cc/565V-GEUM].

4.

See Peace Talks in Focus 2018. Report on Trends and Scenarios,
RELIEFWEB (Sept. 5, 2018), https://reliefweb.int/report/world/peacetalks-focus-2018-report-trends-and-scenarios
[https://perma.cc/NC8ZDZJ6].

5.

See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Ambassador Holbrooke Interview on ABC’s
Nightline
Transcript
(Mar.
24,
1999),
https://19972001.state.gov/policy_remarks/1999/990324_holbrooke_nghtln.html
[https://perma.cc/7X4X-XZB2].

6.

See Andrew Osborn, Milosevic charged with genocide, GUARDIAN (Nov.
23,
2001), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/nov/24/balkans.warcr
ime [https://perma.cc/X7LX-KMSX].

7.

See
Richard
Holbrooke,
PBS, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/intervie
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agreement, accommodating, legitimizing, and emboldening Milošević. 8
Subsequent to the Dayton Accords, in 1998, Milošević launched a
campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Kosovar Albanians.9 In 1999,
Milošević was indicted for the atrocities perpetrated in Kosovo 10 and in
2001, for crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. 11
When thinking about peace and justice, I suggest we should replace
the metaphor of the arsonist and the fireman with a Wile E. Coyote
and the Roadrunner metaphor. In this famous cartoon series, Wile E.
Coyote devises increasingly elaborate and innovative tactics to catch
up to the much faster Roadrunner. Justice, in a way, is like Wile E.
Coyote. The odds of Wile E. Coyote catching the Roadrunner are slim,
similar to the way that provisions for justice and accountability in a
peace agreement are often pushed aside in favor of impunity for the
perpetrators of crimes. Nonetheless, Wile E. Coyote keeps trying with
each subsequent opportunity, much like the persistent pursuit for
justice.
Over the course of this speech, I will examine how justice has
repeatedly worked to find a foothold in the peace process and how the
international community can continue to work towards embedding
accountability into peace processes going forward in order to achieve
durable peace.

Era of Impunity
Justice did not have a very successful start. During most of the
twentieth century, the international community treated amnesty and
immunity as the “price for peace.” 12
ws/holbrooke.html [https://perma.cc/U5LD-MVN8] (last accessed Feb.
20, 2020).
8.

See PAUL R. WILLAIMS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, PEACE WITH JUSTICE: WAR
CRIMES AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 152 (2002).

9.

See Ivo Daalder & Michael O’Hanlon, The Roots of the War, PBS,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/readings/root
s.html [https://perma.cc/J8PH-4HQU] (last accessed Feb. 20, 2020).

10.

See Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37, Indictment (Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
May
22,
1999),
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/ind/en/milii990524e.htm [https://perma.cc/MC5Z-K88P].

11.

See Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-01-51-I, Indictment (Int’l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Nov.
22,
2001),
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/ind/en/milii011122e.htm [https://perma.cc/9TX5-2TV6].

12.

Keith Doubt, We Had to Jump over the Moral Bridge: Bosnia and the
Pathetic Hegemony of Face-Work, in THE CONCEIT OF INNOCENCE LOSING
THE CONSCIENCE OF THE WEST IN THE WAR AGAINST BOSNIA, at 121
(Texas A&M University Press, 1995).
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For instance, Turkish forces, who many considered responsible for
the genocidal massacre of over one million Armenians during World
War I, were given amnesty in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. 13 Favoring
impunity over justice with peace setting the tone for what would follow
during World War II and beyond. Even to this day, the failure to
account for the Armenian genocide creates extreme tension in the
region, including in the territorial and ethnic Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict and in a continued push for international recognition of the
genocide by the Armenian diaspora. 14
During the Nuremberg Trials that followed World War II, there
was a brief burst of effort to bring accountability back into the process
of building a durable peace. 15 But very quickly, those negotiating peace
agreements moved back towards a strategy that favored impunity.
The Evian Agreement of 1962 granted amnesty to the French and
Algerians responsible for the massacre of thousands of civilians during
the Algerian war. 16 With the divisions and impunities created by that
agreement, Algeria soon entered a brutal civil war with death squads,
horrific massacres, and indiscriminate violence against civilians,
mirroring the atrocities committed in the French-Algerian war. 17
During the 1980s, in an effort to facilitate transitions to democracy,
the governments of Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Uruguay each granted amnesty to members of former regimes, many of
whom had commanded death squads that tortured and killed thousands
of civilians within their respective countries. 18
This trend of trading justice for peace continued with the 1991
Paris Peace Agreement for Cambodia. The agreement did not contain
any accountability provisions for the Khmer Rouge leaders under whose
watch nearly two million people died. 19 It would take several more
13.

See Treaty of Peace with Turkey [Treaty of Lausanne] arts.138–140 (Jan.
30 1923).

14.

See e.g. H.R. 296, 116th Cong. (2019). (This resolution, affirming the
United States record on the Armenian Genocide, was passed over 100
years after the end of the genocide.)

15.

See Nuremberg Trials, Hɪsᴛᴏʀʏ, https://www.history.com/topics/worldwar-ii/nuremberg-trials [https://perma.cc/7A8Q-EHK8] (last updated
June 7, 2019).

16.

See Évian Accords, Mar. 19, 1962, 507 U.N.T.S. 33.

17.

See World Peace Foundation, Algeria: Civil War, MASS ATROCITY
ENDINGS
(Aug.
7,
2015),
https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/72/
[https://perma.cc/8FLC-78SH].

18.

See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and
Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law, 78 Cᴀʟ.
L. Rᴇᴠ. 451, 458–61, 484 (1990).

19.

See Ben Kiernan, The Demography of Genocide in Southeast Asia: The
Death Tolls in Cambodia, 1975-79, and East Timor, 1975-80, 4 CRITICAL
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years of political turmoil until the Prime Minister of Cambodia wrote
a letter in 1997 to the U.N. Secretary General requesting help in setting
up a court to try the leaders of the Khmer Rouge. 20 Not until 2006—
three decades after the genocide (which took place 1975-1979)—did the
U.N. General Assembly approve a hybrid court, established with both
Cambodian and U.N. judges presiding over the trials for the surviving
Khmer Rouge leaders. 21 The court would ultimately convict leaders
Kang Kek Lew, Nuon Chea, and Khieu Samphan, among others, for
crimes against humanity and genocide—thirty years later. 22
We can look to the current turmoil in Yemen for the consequences
of providing amnesty in a peace agreement. Article 3 of the 2011 Gulf
Cooperation Council Peace Agreement called for the Parliament to pass
“laws granting immunity from legal and judicial prosecution to the
President [Ali Abdullah Saleh] and those who worked with him during
his time in office.” 23 The U.N. Envoy for Yemen had provided
facilitative support to the Gulf Cooperation Council to secure such an
agreement. 24 Following the signing of the Agreement, the U.N. Security
Council stressed the need for a human rights investigation into the
alleged violations from the conflict, “with a view to avoiding impunity
and ensuring accountability.” 25 The U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights also quickly condemned the Agreement when it was
passed with the explicit amnesty provision for Saleh, urging Yemeni

ASIAN STUDIES 585, 587 (2003). See generally Letter dated 30 October
1991 from the Permanent Representatives of France and Indonesia to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/46/608S/23177 (Oct. 30, 1991).
20.

See U.N. President of the S.C., Letter dated June 23, 1997 from SecretaryGeneral to the President of the General Assembly and to the President of
the Security Council, U.N. Doc. A/51/93 (June 24, 1997).

21.

See G.A. Res. 57/228, art. 5 (May 22, 2003).

22.

See Trial Chamber Summary of Judgement Case 002/02, ECCC,
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/%5Bd
ate-intz%5D/20181217%20Summary%20of%20Judgement%20Case%2000202%20ENG_FINAL%20FOR%20PUBLICATION.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B6W6-4T3K] (last accessed Feb. 9, 2020)

23.

Agreement on the Implementation Mechanism for the Transition Process
in Yemen in Accordance with the Initiative of the Gulf Cooperation
Council art. 3, Nov. 23, 2011.

24.

See Background, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ENVOY OF THE SECRETARYhttps://osesgy.unmissions.org/background
GENERAL FOR YEMEN,
[https://perma.cc/LY6D-JEH8] (last accessed Feb. 10, 2020)

25.

S.C. Res. 2014, ¶ 7 (Oct. 21, 2011).
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lawmakers to ensure that the amnesty did not violate international
law’s prohibition against amnesties for gross human rights violations. 26
Notwithstanding, Yemen’s national unity cabinet passed an
amnesty law in 2012 that gave President Saleh and his aides complete
amnesty for all abuses committed during his twenty-two years in
office. 27
Three years later, in 2015, Saleh joined forces with Houthi rebels
to tip Yemen into civil war. 28 He broke ties with the rebels in 2017,
and Houthi forces assassinated him shortly thereafter. 29 The civil war
continues today, in no small part due to the decision to grant Saleh
immunity rather than use criminal prosecution to permanently remove
him from the political landscape in Yemen. 30
In 1971, Idi Amin seized the Ugandan Presidency in a military
coup. 31 He suspended the constitution, 32 turned Uganda into a military
state that murdered nearly all political opponents, and sought to purge
nearly every ethnic group except the Kakwas, Sudanese, and Nubians. 33
26.

See March 2012 Monthly Forecast, SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT (Feb. 29,
2012),
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/201203/lookup_c_glkwlemtisg_b_7996437.php
[https://perma.cc/S6EZ5B8L].

27.

See Yemen cabinet approves President Saleh amnesty law, BBC NEWS
(Jan. 8, 2012), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-16463802
[https://perma.cc/64EC-4MWZ].

28.

See Yemen’s Saleh declares alliance with Houthis, AL-JAZEERA (May 11,
2015),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/cloneofcloneofcloneofstrikesyemen-saada-breach--150510143647004.html [https://perma.cc/8XGH9FKR].

29.

‘See Yemen: Ex: President Ali Abdullah Saleh killed, AL-JAZEERA (Dec.
10, 2017), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/houthi-media-aliabdullah-saleh-killed-sanaa-171204123328290.html
[https://perma.cc/V2VB-A5HN].

30.

See Unpunished Massacre: Yemen’s Failed Response to the “Friday of
Dignity” Killings, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 12, 2013),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/02/12/unpunished-massacre/yemensfailed-response-friday-dignity-killings [https://perma.cc/28XM-6BRU].

31.

See John Fairhall, Curfew in Uganda after military coup topples Obote,
(Jan.
26,
1971),
GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/1971/jan/26/fromthearchive
[https://perma.cc/8PXR-ERV7].

32.

See Hanibal Goitom, Today in History: Idi Amin Overthrows President
Milton Obote in Uganda, LIBR. OF CONGRESS (Jan. 25, 2018),
https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2018/01/today-in-history-idi-aminoverthrows-president-milton-obote-in-uganda/ [https://perma.cc/WZ2CCAJA].

33.

‘See World Peace Foundation, Uganda: 2nd Obote Regime, MASS
ATROCITY
ENDINGS
(Aug.
7,
2015),
https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/uganda-idi-amin-
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The estimated death count was 100,000 - 500,000. 34 Tanzanian forces
ousted him from power, but instead of facing prosecution, he was able
to flee: first to Libya, and then to Saudi Arabia where he lived until his
death in 2003. 35 The Saudi royal family allowed him sanctuary and
paid him a generous subsidy on the condition that he stayed entirely
out of politics. 36 During his almost 25 years in soft exile, no nation
seriously tried to bring him to justice. 37 Human Rights Watch
unsuccessfully attempted to bring his case before the U.N. Commission
on Human Rights. 38
In Haiti in the 1970s and 1980s, Jean-Claude Duvalier, often
referred to as “Baby Doc,” assumed power following the death of his
father (“Papa Doc”). 39 Baby Doc’s repressive reign saw thousands
killed, hundreds of thousands forced to flee to escape the country’s
corruption and oppressive rule, and over half of the population living
in abject poverty. 40 All the while, however, the U.S. and many other
countries continued to financially and politically support Baby Doc.41
Even when Haitians revolted against Baby Doc’s rule in 1985, the U.S.
helped him flee to France, which turned a blind eye to his stay and
provided him with a de facto amnesty. 42
milton-obote-and-the-national-resistance-movement/
[https://perma.cc/98F6-BGKD]; Mamadou Tall, Notes on the Civil and
Political Strife in Uganda, 12 A J. OF OPINION, 41–44 (1982).
34.

Uganda, supra note 33.

35.

See
Idi
Amin
Biography,
https://www.biography.com/political-figure/idi-amin
[https://perma.cc/6ZNV-8XKM].

36.

See, e.g., Ethan Bronner, The Obscenely Easy Exile of Idi Amin, GLOBAL
POLICY
FORUM
(Aug.
19,
2003),
https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/164/28440.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/36SX-BVL7].

37.

See id.

38.

Id.

39.

See Hugh O’Shaughnessy, Jean-Claude Duvalier: Brutal Haitian dictator
who ruled the country for 15 years, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 5,
2014), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/jean-claudeduvalier-former-president-of-haiti-who-brutalised-his-opponents-and-wasprevented-from-9776019.html [https://perma.cc/4E8A-PMDN].

40.

See Nathalie Baptiste, Terror, Repression and Diaspora: The Baby Doc
(Oct.
23,
2014),
Legacy
in
Haiti,
NATION
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/terror-repression-anddiaspora-baby-doc-legacy-haiti/ [https://perma.cc/8NVV-ANGG].

41.

See HELEN CHAPIN, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
235 (1989).

42.

See Fran Quigley, From cradle to grave, United States protected Jean(Oct.
13,
2014),
Claude
Duvalier,
INDYSTAR
https://www.indystar.com/story/opinion/2014/10/13/cradle-grave-
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Stepping Stones: Building a Path Towards Justice
Although many twentieth-century mediators feared that pushing
for justice would jeopardize peace, the demand for justice persisted.
Even in instances where amnesty provisions seemed to contribute to
the initial peace, most of the countries later felt it necessary to seek
justice in some form.
For instance, after the 2010 earthquake that devastated Haiti, Baby
Doc returned to Haiti under the guise of assisting in the reconstruction
process. 43 Unlike the previous cases of amnesty discussed in this
section, Haiti determined it could not risk accepting him back and
ignoring his prior crimes. 44 Upon his arrival, the Haitian police
immediately took him into custody and charged him with human rights
abuses as well as corruption, theft, and misappropriation of funds.45
Baby Doc appeared before a domestic Haitian court in 2013, 46 although
he died of a heart attack in 2014 before the judicial process concluded.47
In this case and in others, stakeholders began learning that to
secure durable peace, negotiators must strive for peace with justice.
Recently, the international community has increasingly recognized that
securing justice helps create stable, peaceful societies after conflict
by: (1) establishing individual responsibility and denying collective
guilt, (2) delegitimizing institutions and war criminals responsible for

united-states-protected-jean-claude-duvalier/17191805/
[https://perma.cc/WR2U-M9M9].
43.

See Joseph Guyler Delva, Jean-Claude Duvalier Taken to Haiti Hospital
(Mar.
21,
2011),
after
Falling
Ill,
REUTERS
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-haiti-duvalieridUSTRE72N5L920110324 [https://perma.cc/S9F4-7MM7].

44.

Mark Memmott, In Haiti: ‘Baby Doc’ Duvalier Taken into Custody, NPR
(Jan.
18,
2011),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2011/01/18/133021050/in-haiti-papa-doc-duvalier-taken-intocustody [https://perma.cc/C9Z4-6PWA].

45.

Amelie Baron, Former Haitian dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier dies at 63,
REUTERS (Oct. 4, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-haitiduvalier/former-haitian-dictator-jean-claude-duvalier-dies-at-63idUSKCN0HT0KI20141004 [https://perma.cc/Q3YE-QVGK]

46.

The Baby Doc Duvalier Prosecution, CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY,
https://cja.org/what-we-do/litigation/amicusbriefs/the-baby-doc-duvalier-prosecution/
[https://perma.cc/Q3TLY78F]

47.

Baptiste, supra note 40.
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the commission of atrocities, (3) establishing an accurate historical
record, (4) providing victim catharsis, and (5) promoting deterrence. 48
This switch to peace with justice, however, did not happen
instantaneously with the case of Yugoslavia. In fact, the international
community was much slower to act to achieve a just peace than is often
recalled, doing so only after embargo, 49 deploying multiple iterations of
peacekeeping missions, 50 and adopting and then later enforcing a no-fly
zone. 51
The push towards justice started first with a U.N. Commission of
Experts led by Cherif Bassiouni, 52 which found evidence of “grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of
international humanitarian law” including “willful killing, ‘ethnic
cleansing’ and mass killings, torture, rape, pillage and destruction of
civilian property, destruction of cultural and religious property and
arbitrary arrests.” 53 In the face of such a comprehensive and damning
report, the U.N. Security Council was forced to pass Resolution 827 in
1993 to establish an international criminal tribunal to further
investigate these claims. 54 Justice Richard Goldstone of South Africa
was appointed as Chief Prosecutor in 1994. 55
In the summer of 1995, just before the Dayton talks, Justice
Goldstone indicted Bosnian Serb politician Radovan Karadžić and
military commander Ratko Mladić, preventing them from attending the
negotiations. 56 Though the Tribunal was accused of undermining the
potential for peace, Justice Goldstone maintained that the exclusion of
Karadžić and Mladić from the talks facilitated the participation of the

48.

Michael P. Scharf &amp; Paul R. Williams, The Functions of Justice and
Anti-Justice in the Peace-Building Process, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.
161, 170 (2003).

49.

See G.A. Res. 713 (Sept. 25, 1991).

50.

See G.A. Res. 743 (Feb. 21, 1992).

51.

See G.A. Res. 816 (March 31, 1993).

52.

See International Commissions of Inquiry, Fact-finding Missions: Europe,
NATIONS
RESEARCH
GUIDES,
UNITED
http://libraryresources.unog.ch/c.php?g=462695&amp;p=3162820#2149
4667 [https://perma.cc/HA2N-Y2X8].

53.

U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), ¶¶ 7, 9, U.N.
Doc. S/5704 (May 3, 2993).

54.

See G.A. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993).

55.

JUSTICE
PROJECT,
Hon.
Richard
Goldstone,
WORLD
https://worldjusticeproject.org/about-us/who-we-are/honorarychairs/richard_goldstone [https://perma.cc/X6NX-S3SQ].

56.

See Prosecutor v. Karadžić and Mladić,, Case No. IT-95-5-I, Indictment
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, July 25, 1995).
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Bosnian government. 57 Indeed, in his written account of this period,
Justice Goldstone notes that these cases were prioritized because of the
“persistent stories of the massacre of thousands of Muslim men and
boys by the Bosnian Serb Army, led by Mladić.” 58 In this sense, the
Bosnians would likely not have sat across the negotiating table from
Karadžić and Mladić, who were widely understood to be committing
mass atrocities against the Bosnian people.
Justice Goldstone urged Richard Holbrooke, who was mediating the
Dayton Accords, to include accountability provisions in the final
language, particularly terms obligating the parties to cooperate with
the Tribunal and for NATO forces to arrest indicted war criminals.59
Even having removed Karadžić and Mladić from the negotiations, three
of the four signatories of the Dayton Accords would ultimately be
indicted or indictable for atrocity crimes. 60 Though the Accords
themselves contain provisions requiring the parties to cooperate with
the Tribunal and preventing indicted individuals from running for
office, 61 they prioritized peace at the expense of justice, accommodating
war criminals as signatories. In an ironic twist, the U.S. Secretary of
State Warren Christopher titled his speech announcing the Dayton
Accords “Peace with Justice,” even though the underlying public
declarations of support for justice were maneuvers made to legitimize
the arsonists of the conflict as firemen. 62
True accountability and justice proved to be timid and tardy; most
of the Tribunal’s significant prosecutions would not take place until
after the conflict in Kosovo occurred three years later. Most of the
initial individuals tried by the Tribunal were low-level perpetrators,
57.

PURSUING JUSTICE IN ONGOING CONFLICT: A DISCUSSION OF CURRENT
PRACTICE 3 (International Center for Transitional Justice Prosecution
Program, 2007).

58.

RICHARD J. GOLDSTONE, FOR HUMANITY: REFLECTIONS OF A WAR CRIMES
INVESTIGATOR 108 (Yale University Press, 2000).

59.

Michael P. Scharf, The Tools for Enforcing International Criminal Justice
in the New Millennium: Lessons from the Yugoslavia Tribunal, 49
DEPAUL L. REV. 925, 953, 955 (2000).

60.

Julian Borger, Bosnia’s Bitter, Flawed Peace Deal, 20 Years On, THE
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
10,
2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/global/2015/nov/10/bosnia-bitter-flawedpeace-deal-dayton-agreement-20-years-on
[https://perma.cc/BSC6ETF9].

61.

Madeleine Albright (Permanent Representative), Letter dated 29
November 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the United States
of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,
U.N. Doc. A/50/79c, S/1995/999, art. 8, 10 (Nov. 30 1995).

62.

PAUL R. WILLIAMS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, PEACE WITH JUSTICE: WAR
CRIMES AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 157 (Rowman
& Littlefield 2002).
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including traffic cops, foot soldiers, prison camp guards, and some
members of paramilitary units. 63 The Tribunal’s myopic mandate was
focused narrowly on individual responsibility, and when combined with
a fear of mission creep, it produced a timid tribunal that provided
limited accountability, especially in its early years. 64 Unfortunately, it
also failed to deter Serb nationalists from committing similar atrocities
in Kosovo just a few years later. 65
During the conflict in Kosovo, the Serb army, police, and
paramilitary waged a systematic and targeted campaign of violent
terror against ethnic Albanians. 66 850,000 Kosovar Albanians were
forcibly expelled from Kosovo and about 590,000 were internally
displaced. 67 It was not until after a humanitarian intervention in
Kosovo by NATO, and subsequent economic pressure that Serbia sent
its former President, Slobodan Milošević, the “fireman” of the Dayton
Accords, to The Hague. 68 There, the Yugoslavia Tribunal tried
Milošević for his atrocity crimes, although he died before the trial
concluded. 69
Biljana Plavšić was also eventually indicted by the Tribunal for
war crimes, but only after she had served as President of Republika
Srpska for two years. 70 Additionally, Momčilo Krajišnik, who served as
President of Bosnia for two years, and Jadranko Prlić, who served as
the Foreign Minister of Bosnia, were also convicted of war crimes after
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serving in political offices. 71 In significant part, the region is peaceful
because those who had committed war crimes and then assumed power
were ultimately removed by the Tribunal, but this accountability was
seriously delayed.
The 1990s also saw genocide in Rwanda. In 1994, 800,000 Tutsis
and moderate Hutus were killed over the course of 100 days. 72 There
was not a formal peace agreement after the violence because the Tutsi
exile-led Rwandan Patriotic Front forces seized control, 73 but there was
nevertheless a stark need for justice. In 1995, the U.N. Security Council
passed Resolution 995, establishing the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda. 74 Interestingly, Rwanda was the only state to vote against
the creation of the Tribunal. 75 Rwanda objected on the grounds that
the Tribunal’s temporal jurisdiction only covered crimes committed
from January 1 to December 31, 1994, omitting crimes from the early
1990s; the Tribunal was based in The Hague not Kigali; and the
Tribunal would not be able to impose the death penalty. 76
Although the Rwandan Tribunal could not provide accountability
for all perpetrators—relying on domestic prosecutions and gacaca
courts to complement its proceedings—it nonetheless was a vital part
of the effort to provide justice after the genocide. The Rwandan
Tribunal was the first to deliver verdicts against those responsible for
committing genocide; the first to deliver verdicts that established rape
as a method of committing genocide; and the first to hold people
responsible for media broadcasts intended to provoke the public to
perpetrate acts of violence and genocide. 77 In total, the Tribunal
indicted 93 people, convicted 62, 78 and made significant progress in
establishing the international criminal tribunal as a model for postconflict accountability.
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In the case of Sierra Leone, the parties agreed to an amnesty in
their peace agreement, similar to the case of Yemen discussed earlier.
For Sierra Leone, however, accountability managed to pierce the initial
amnesty.
From 1991 through 2002, Sierra Leone’s army fought against the
National Patriotic Front of Liberia led by Charles Taylor and the
collaborating Revolutionary United Front, led by a former army
corporal, Foday Sankoh. 79 On July 7, 1999, the Government of Sierra
Leone and the Revolutionary United Front signed the Lomé Peace
Agreement. 80 The agreement granted full pardons and amnesty to
Corporal Foday Sankoh, as well as to all combatants, collaborators, and
members of the armed parties. 81
U.N. Secretary-General Special Representative Ambassador
Francis Okelo was a signatory to the Lomé Agreement. 82 Yet, U.N.
Secretary-General Kofi Annan explicitly instructed him to append his
signature with a statement that the U.N. “holds the understanding that
the amnesty and pardon in article IX of the agreement shall not apply
to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian
law.” 83 Though the Lomé Agreement prioritized peace over more
immediate justice, the U.N. sought to preserve the chance for future
accountability mechanisms.
The Revolutionary United Front failed to respect the Lomé
Agreement. Shortly after signing, the Front took 500 peacekeepers
hostage, prompting the British to intervene to bring an end to the
violence. 84 A year later, a push for justice emerged when President of
Sierra Leone Ahmad Tejan Kabbah made a formal request to U.N.
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Secretary-General Kofi Annan for investigations of those responsible for
war crimes perpetrated during the civil war. 85
The U.N. and the Sierra Leonean government jointly established a
hybrid tribunal, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, in January 2002.86
The Special Court for Sierra Leone, under the leadership of Chief
Prosecutor David Crane and Chief of Prosecutions Jim Johnson, sought
to prosecute those most responsible for the most serious crimes.
The Court ultimately indicted Foday Sankoh, who had previously
been granted amnesty by the Lomé Agreement, for crimes against
humanity conducted both before and after the signing of the
Agreement. 87 Sankoh’s amnesty was invalidated, as the Court’s
mandate included prosecuting those most responsible for violations of
international humanitarian and Sierra Leonean law since November 30,
1996, including those who threatened the peace process. 88 Sankoh had
also previously failed to disarm following the signing of the Agreement,
and was arrested prior to this indictment. 89 He died while awaiting
trial. 90
The Special Court also indicted Charles Taylor, the Liberian
President, for war crimes and crimes against humanity due to his role
providing support and planning attacks during the Sierra Leone civil
war. 91 Taylor claimed immunity from prosecution as a sitting Head of
State. 92 The Appeals Chamber of the Special Court rejected this claim
on the basis that international law does not protect Heads of State from
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being prosecuted for serious international crimes. 93 Taylor was
convicted and sentenced to 50 years, which he is serving in the U.K. 94
Despite the challenges of post-conflict stabilization, Liberia and Sierra
Leone have to a large degree persisted in peace because of the removal
of Taylor and the RUF, including Sankoh, from the political
environment.

The Future of Accountability
The current moment foreshadows a mixed future for post-conflict
accountability and justice mechanisms. Although there has been
important momentum in pushing for justice, political impasse has often
made the justice mechanisms difficult to implement.
In the case of the Libyan revolution to overthrow Muammar
Gaddafi there was an estimated 25,000 dead, 4,000 missing, and over
100,000 displaced. 95 In this case, the U.N. Security Council took two
important actions. First, the Security Council acted quickly and
unanimously referred the case of Libya to the International Criminal
Court on the grounds of the use of violence against civilians, including
peaceful protestors. 96 Second, the Security Council authorized a
humanitarian intervention under Resolution 1973. 97
The ICC investigation produced three cases for “the crimes against
humanity of persecution based on political grounds and murder
committed.” 98 The first was against Muammar Gaddafi, for committing
crimes against humanity. 99 The second was against Abdullah AlSenussi, for the role he played as an “indirect co-perpetrator” while
serving as the director of military intelligence under Gaddafi’s rule.100
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The third was against Gaddafi’s son, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, also for
acting as an “indirect co-perpetrator” of crimes against humanity. 101
Halfway through the NATO-led air campaign, some diplomats
became concerned about the outcome and wanted to begin negotiations
with Gaddafi. 102 The international community was able to invoke the
ICC investigation to prevent a negotiation that may have led to the
appeasement and accommodation of Gaddafi. 103 The NATO coalition
and allied forces did ultimately succeed in defeating Gaddafi, 104 who
was killed in an act of mob violence. 105
Despite these promising signs of ICC involvement in Libya, the
ICC’s investigations and prosecutions have been rife with political
impasse. Gaddafi died before his trial could proceed. 106 The ICC’s PreTrial Chamber I ruled Al-Senussi’s case inadmissible in 2013 because
domestic courts were willing and able to prosecute, a decision that was
upheld by the Appeal Chamber in 2014. 107 Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi’s case
remains in the pre-trial stage. 108
In 2014 ICC defense lawyer Melinda Taylor was detained for three
weeks by rebels in the Zintan region, while attempting to visit her
client, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi. 109 A local brigade commander accused
Taylor of smuggling secret letters to Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and of
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smuggling in a video camera. 110 Three other members of ICC staff were
held with Taylor, for allegations that they shared documents with their
client that could harm national security. 111 Libya’s Prosecutor General
ruled that the ICC team should be held for 45 days, but they were later
released after three weeks on the grounds of diplomatic immunity. 112
With a new wave of violence that began in 2019, 113 and the
continued perpetration of war crimes during the conflict, 114 the outlook
for accountability and justice in Libya remains mixed.
Accountability similarly faces an uncertain future in Colombia. In
2016, Colombia’s Peace Agreement with the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) established one of the most comprehensive
and detailed arrangements for transitional justice in a peace agreement,
giving hope to a durable peace in the country. 115 The agreement
included the structure for a Special Jurisdiction for Peace—a collection
of six bodies, centering around a Tribunal for Peace. 116 The Tribunal
can deliver judgements and impose sanctions on those responsible for
crimes committed during the armed conflict, including atrocity
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crimes. 117 The Special Jurisdiction for Peace includes non-traditional
or alternative sentencing options, sanctions which depend on the degree
of truth expressed, the gravity of the act, the level of responsibility and
liability, and reparations undertaken and guarantees of nonrecurrence. 118 Retribution is reserved only for those who do not
cooperate with the process. 119
The people of Colombia rejected this peace agreement in a
statewide referendum. 120 The rejection not only illustrated the people’s
opposition to creating a path for FARC to become a political party,
but also the populace’s belief that there was not enough accountability
and prosecutions built into the agreement. 121
The hybrid accountability framework set out in the 2016 agreement
appeared to insufficiently hold accountable those who were most
responsible for the most serious crimes committed during the conflict.122
Under the 2016 plan, members of the FARC that voluntarily came
forward would be diverted into special criminal proceedings. 123 If they
gave full and honest accounts of their acts, they could receive reduced
sentences for their crimes. 124
For too many Colombians, it appeared that this piecemeal
transitional framework overpromised and under-delivered, especially
with regards to accountability. 125 Specifically, FARC members who
had engaged in the decades-long violence could, through the procedures
set forth by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, remain unindicted.126
After the negative referendum outcome, the government rerouted the
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agreement through Congress, mostly without altering the provisions
which angered voters in the plebiscite. 127
So far, peace has largely held in Colombia. Yet, in response to
what they perceive to be inadequate guarantees of safety from the state,
certain factions of the FARC have recently reneged on their
commitment to the peace process, vowing a new stage of violence. 128 It
remains to be seen whether the transitional justice arrangements set up
in the Special Jurisdiction for Peace can bring peace with justice in the
long term.
In Syria, atrocities and violations of international law are welldocumented, yet there are insufficient routes for justice. The Geneva
Communiqué, the outcome of a U.N.-backed peace conference on Syria,
initially called for a “comprehensive package for transitional justice,
including compensation or rehabilitation for victims of the present
conflict, steps towards national reconciliation and forgiveness.” 129 This
Communiqué was annexed into U.N. Security Council Resolution
2118, 130 but two years later when many of Resolution 2118’s provisions
were embedded into Resolution 2254, 131 the accountability provisions
were omitted. In 2014, the U.N. Security Council made another
attempt at accountability with a French-led referral of Syria to the
ICC; however, the resolution was vetoed by Russia and China. 132
The U.N. General Assembly tried to overcome the impasse at the
U.N. Security Council by creating an International, Impartial and
Independent Mechanism (IIIM) to collect, preserve and analyze
evidence of international law violations. 133 Notably, the IIIM is not
empowered to prosecute or adjudicate cases. 134
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Though the permanent members of the Security Council may be
divided over the potential of accountability mechanisms, smaller states
may be starting to take the lead in demanding justice. For instance,
Bangladesh—where most of the survivors of the Rohingya genocide in
Burma have fled—is a state party to the Rome Statute. 135 This has
allowed the ICC to launch an investigation of the crime of forced
deportation of the Rohingya in Bangladesh as part of the genocide
committed against the Rohingya. 136 The investigation is narrow in
scope, however, because the ICC only has jurisdiction over the crime of
deportation across the border into a state party to the ICC. 137 Other
crimes against humanity and acts of genocide committed against the
Rohingya in Burma are beyond the scope of the investigation, and as a
consequence, currently beyond the reach of the ICC. 138
States have also reinvigorated the principle of universal jurisdiction
to hold individuals accountable for certain crimes that present universal
danger. Under this principle, states can prosecute criminals that are in
their territory, regardless of the defendant’s or victim’s nationality, and
no matter the location the alleged crime. 139 Though a nascent tool, in
2018, it was used to name 149 suspects in fifteen states. Of these,
seventeen are standing trial, eight have been convicted, and two have
been acquitted. 140
Despite these encouraging developments, universal jurisdiction has
significant limitations. The accused must be present within a state that
accepts the principle of universal jurisdiction. 141 This principle is often
invoked when other forms of criminal jurisdiction are not available,
meaning that the defendant cannot be prosecuted elsewhere.142
Additionally, there is often domestic disinterest in universal
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jurisdiction, as some residents wonder why resources are being
redirected to prosecute crimes committed beyond their borders. While
innovations such as universal jurisdiction and the IIIM are promising
and necessary, they have not proven to be sufficient to secure peace
with justice in contexts such as Syria.
Notably, however, there is a universal truth relating to the demand
for justice by victims of atrocities. Last year, I organized a team of
lawyers and investigators that deployed to the refugee camps in
Bangladesh to document the atrocities that had been committed
against the Rohingya. It was astounding how oftentimes when the
investigators would describe the project, the refugees would reply, “this
is good, we need justice, not just food.” 143 In November 2019, the
International Criminal Court authorized an investigation into the
crimes committed against the Rohingya. 144 The Registry reports that
many of the victims consulted “believe that only justice and
accountability can ensure that the perceived cycle of violence and abuse
comes to an end and that the Rohingya can go back to their homeland,
Myanmar, in a dignified manner and with full citizenship rights.” 145
These sentiments remind us that comprehensive transitional
justice—as hard as it is to achieve—cannot be forgotten, and it is
incumbent on peace negotiators to carve out space for accountability
and justice in order to achieve a durable peace.
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